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This article examines the Levellers’ doctrine of legitimate authority, by 
showing how it emerged as a critique of theories of absolute sovereignty. For 
the Levellers, any arbitrary power is tyrannical, insofar as it reduces human 
beings to an unnatural condition. Legitimate authority is necessarily founded 
on the people, who creates the constitutional order and remains the locus of 
political power. The Levellers also contend that parliamentary representation 
is not the only mechanism by which the people may acquire a political being; 
rather the people outside Parliament are the collective agent able to transform 
and control institutions and policies. In this sense, the Levellers hold that a 
highly participative community should exert sovereignty, and that decentralized 
government is a means to achieve that goal.
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa como os Levellers desenvolveram uma doutrina da 
autoridade legítima, com base na crítica à teorias da soberania absoluta. Para os 
Levellers, qualquer poder arbitrário é tirânico na medida que reduz os seres humanos 
a uma condição desnaturada. A autoridade legítima se funda necessariamente no 
povo, que cria a ordem constitucional e permanence como depositário do poder 
politico. Os Levellers também defendem que a representação parlamentar não é o 
único meio de dotar o povo de atuação política. Antes, o povo fora do Parlamento 
é o agente coletivo capaz de transformar as instituições e práticas políticas. Nesse 
sentido, os Levellers sustentam que uma comunidade extremamente participativa 
deveria exercer a soberania e que o governo descentralizado é o caminho para 
alcançar essa finalidade.
Palavras-chave: soberania limitada, constituição, povo, lei, direitos.
I
By the mid-1640’s, as the first civil war seemed to culminate in a settlement 
between the Parliament and the Scots, civilians and soldiers from the ranks 
of the New Model Army began to combine their efforts to fight the probable 
imposition of a Presbyterian discipline in England. This movement, that from 
1645 to 1647 inundated the streets of London with demonstrations, petitions 
and pamphlets, would later be labelled as “Leveller”3. It was originally a term 
of abuse. It expressed the fears of social and political subversion, that would, 
according to a contemporary critic, “equalize, subvert, and confound persons”, 
and give voice to a “giddy people, made up of biased and engaged men, and 
some strangers, rash youth, silly women and maiden”.4
But the Levellers were far from being a unified group, much less a political 
party organization.5 John Lilburne, Richard Overton, William Walwyn, John 
Wildman and Thomas Prince differed in important issues, as the role of Magna 
Carta as a source of rights and the extent of franchise. Again, their political 
thinking was both pragmatic and polemical, so that many of Leveller writings 
can be seen as casuistic responses to the political crisis that developed in London 
and its environs between 1646 and 1649. There was also significant ideological 
diversity with Lilburne grounding his arguments for annual parliaments in 
English history and fourteenth-century precedent, Overton arguing from 
natural law, and Wildman making appeals to republican principles. It would be 
3  The word “Leveller” was first used after the debates of Putney, either by Cromwell or Charles I. 
See Vernon & Baker (2010), pp. 39-59. See also Vernon (2012). pp. 198-201.
4  Jones (1646).
5  Scott (2000), pp. 270-1.
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reasonable to infer, therefore, not only that they were rather political activists 
than political theorists, but also that they did not share a common theoretical 
ground.6 
Although I recognize the relevance of seeing the Levellers as a plural and 
heterogeneous movement, I assume in this paper that it is possible to identify 
a core of radical political ideas in the Leveller program. As David Como has 
recently argued, as early as 1645, the future leaders of the Leveller movement 
had already elaborated a consistent criticism of existing English political 
system, demanding its complete reform on behalf of the rights and liberties of 
the English people. Martin Loughlin goes even further, and asserts that Leveller 
principles can “fit together to form a coherent constitutional philosophy”, while 
Rachel Foxley has compellingly demonstrated how “the Levellers unified 
round a distinctive and radical vision of the political future”.7 In what follows, I 
shall endorse that approach, arguing that Levellers’ struggle against absolutism 
and their efforts to speak for the demands of the people outside the scope of 
Parliament result in coherent corpus about the foundations of legitimate political 
authority, which may be described as a doctrine of limited power and authority. 
My thesis is that we may find in Levellers’s writings a distinctive doctrine 
of sovereignty and government, though the Levellers themselves sometimes 
take government for sovereignty. This puzzlement reflects the complex relations 
– which the Levellers seem to acknowledge – between popular sovereignty, 
constitutionalism and the social force of the people. While “constitutionalism” 
implies the limitation of government by impartial law, theories of sovereignty 
assert that the source of authority is single and unbounded.8 Equally inevitable 
is the tension between constitutionalism and the conception of people as 
acting outside the institutions.9 Henceforth arises a vicious circle: if the people 
as sovereign are bounded by their own laws, they have no extra-legal power 
to change the constitution or the government; inversely, if the sovereign is 
absolute, she is not subjected to her own laws. 
It is beyond the scope of this piece to provide a solution for the dilemma in 
contemporary terms. My point is to emphasize the Levellers’ extreme reluctance 
to endorse a highly institutionalized vision of sovereignty, according to which 
sovereignty is exerted by means of representation and requires the creation 
of a single abstract political person. For the same reason, the Levellers reject 
a strongly centralized authority, whose uncontrolled power could threaten 
individual liberties. In this sense, they argue for contestatory sovereignty, 
6  Purkiss (2012), p. 476; Braddick (2008), p. 444. Peacey (2012), p. 51.
7  David (2006), pp. 353-382; Loughlin (2007), p. 17; Foxley, (2013), p. 7.
8  On a characterization of absolutism, see Hoekstra (2013), p. 1080. Lee speaks about “mutual 
hostility between the competing ideals of unlimited popular self-rule and constitutionalism” (Lee 
(2016), pp. 1-2).
9  See Ochoa Espejo (2012).
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according to which the people retain the means to resist and oppose any 
governmental abuse, having resort to mechanisms of dissent, accountability 
and constant surveillance of government activity – all of which presuppose a 
high level of civic participation. But the Levellers also develop a positive view 
of sovereignty, in which the people are the foundation of constitutional rule 
and remain the locus of political authority. This means that the constituting 
power of the people takes priority over the constituted powers inasmuch as 
it generates and organizes it. And, as the Levellers did not have a will-based 
conception of sovereignty, they understood that the sovereign could not abolish 
her own laws if she willed. Instead, they conceived of sovereignty as based on 
natural law or reason,10 which allowed them to oppose not only the unlimited 
exercise of power, but also, more remarkably, unlimited power itself. 
As I shall also claim, pace Foxley, Leveller doctrine of limited power was 
not merely a radicalization of, but primarily a departure from parliamentary 
sovereignty.11 The rupture with parliamentarian doctrines was decisive in 
shaping a peculiar vision of popular government and sovereignty. In order to 
make my point clear, I will start by examining some features of parliamentary 
discourse that will be relevant to understand the Levellers’ positions.
II
One of the first assertions of parliamentary sovereignty was the Militia 
Ordinance of 5th of March 1642, by which means the Parliament commissioned, 
“by the king’s most excellent Majesty and the Lords and Commons in parliament 
assembled”, the men who should command an army to fight against Charles I. 
Since the King refused to give his assent to the Ordinance, on 15th March 1642, 
the Parliament declared, “the People are bound by the Ordinance for the Militia, 
though it has not received the Royal Assent”. A possible explanation for what 
might appear to be a sequestration of the king’s majesty or authority by the 
two Houses of Parliament was soon found in the Declaration of the Lords and 
Commons in Parliament concerning His Majesty’s Proclamation of 6th June 
1642. The parliamentarians assumed that, as the king refused to discharge his 
constitutional duty, they were allowed to exercise the kingly office on behalf of 
the safety of the subjects.12 At least formally, the Militia Ordinance rested on the 
10  Sabbadini (2016), pp. 164-186.
11  Wootton (1990), pp. 654-69. Foxley summarizes the Leveller doctrine of political power as an 
“attempt to meld … parliamentary sovereignty and the appeal to the people”. She is correct in calling 
our attention to the importance Levellers attached to appeals to the people as a means to win massive 
support for their demands, but she understands that “they faced significant difficulties in trying to 
reconcile the appeal to the people to their conviction that the representative chamber was the only 
place were institutional supremacy could reside”. See Foxley (2013). p. 52.
12  Kenyon (1986), pp. 219-226. Besides the documents, Kenyon also provides a fuller background 
161The Levellers’ Conception of Legitimate Authority
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 20, nº 39. Primer semestre de 2018. 
Pp. 157-186.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i39.08
constitutional doctrine of the King-in-Parliament, or the conjoined authority of 
king and Parliament, according to which the king had the prerogative to make 
and change the laws only with the consent of both Commons and Lords during 
the parliamentary assembly. Since the king could not legislate alone, the King-
in-Parliament doctrine offered subjects some legal protection against arbitrary 
actions of the king.13 However, in face of Charles I’s recruitment of an army 
of his own in Oxford in the beginning of 1642, the Houses understood that the 
king had the intention to rule arbitrarily, that is, without the Parliament. 
The Militia Ordinance was readily justified by a number of parliamentarian 
pamphleteers, among them the influential Henry Parker.14 In Observations upon 
his Majesties late answer (1642), Parker redeploys one of the central tenets 
of the radical Protestantism held earlier by Du Plessis Mornay and George 
Buchanan,15 arguing that the Parliament fulfilled its constitutional duty when 
it offered resistance to Charles I’s arbitrariness, thereby preventing the people 
from being reduced to vassals “of the king’s mere will” (p. 9). Assuming that the 
people are “the free and voluntary author of government” (p. 1), Parker suggests 
that two distinct contracts can be established when the people consent to obey 
an authority: a contract intended for the people’s own good and preservation, or 
a contract intended for their own ruin (p. 8). Based on English history, Parker 
supposes that the English people celebrated the first kind of contract, whereby 
they entrusted the king with their safety, establishing conditions and limits to 
his power, like the laws and the Parliament. Parker’s conclusion is that “the 
people may use means of defence where princes are more conditioned, and 
have a sovereignty more limited” (p. 20). When Parliament resisted the king’s 
unlimited prerogative, it was acting on behalf of the people.
Alongside the constitutional doctrine of limited monarchy, Parker builds 
a theory about the nature and extent of popular power. Comparing the body 
of the people to a voluminous body, Parker explains why the people cannot 
themselves resist the king’s tyranny. When the body of the people was raised, 
its motions “were so distracted and irregular, that after much spoil and fruition 
of blood, sometimes onely one tyranny was exchanged for another” (p. 14). 
The remedy to regulate the movement of the people is found in representation, 
by which an elected aristocracy16 is able to simultaneously prevent the turbulent 
of English history from 1642 to 1660, which allows locating the personalities and history of the 
various personages I am considering here. See also Foxley (2013).
13  “In this kingdom the laws are jointly made by a king, by a house of peers and by a house of 
commons chosen by the people all having free votes and particular privileges”(The King’s Answer to 
the Nineteen Propositions. In: Kenyon (1986), p. 19. See also Pocock (1975), p. 363).
14  Mendle (1995); Cromartie (2016), pp. 142-163.
15  Skinner (1978). chap. 9.
16  “… by virtue of election and representation, a few shall act for many, the wise shall consent for 
the simple, the virtue of all shall redound to some, and the prudence of some shall redound to all” 
(Parker (1642), p. 15). The superiority of the representative over the constituents is what Manin calls 
the “principle of distinction” (Manin (1997), pp. 94-95).
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power of the people, and the arbitrary power of king. Representation eventually 
turns Parliament into the “real body of the [people]” (p. 15). So, when the 
king betrays the trust that the people have bestowed on him, “the people may 
assume its own power to do itself right without disturbance to itself, or injury to 
princes” (p. 15). It is noteworthy that the people that take power in that critical 
situation is the Parliament, which is the State itself, by virtue of representing 
all Englishmen (p. 28).17 
As a result of these arguments, Parker makes two bold assertions. First, he 
states that the people cannot withdraw themselves from their representatives; 
otherwise anarchy or tyranny shall follow. It is not clear whether Parker’s theory 
about the extent of popular government condemns individual or collective 
resistance to Parliament on constitutional grounds. Still, heavy sanctions 
are expected against those who resist, since they destroy the moral unity, 
created through representation, between the people outside Parliament and the 
people inside Parliament. Second, although Parker had been an acrimonious 
antagonist to the king’s arbitrary rule,18 he now admits “that there is an arbitrary 
power in every state… and there is no danger in it”.19 Contrary to the king’s 
arbitrary power, parliamentary power is harmless inasmuch as it is founded 
on the consent of the people. Consent and representation are the sole basis 
of legitimacy, and, as it turns out, of parliamentarian absolute sovereignty20. 
It remains to be explained, though, what would hinder the people outside 
Parliament from recovering their original power when they felt that they were 
being treated as slaves by the people inside Parliament.
The Presbyterian divine Charles Herle provides an answer to this disturbing 
question, by means of the idea of “reserved powers”.21 Like Parker and other 
parliamentarian writers, Herle accounts for the Militia Ordinance within the 
framework of the constitutional doctrine of King-in-Parliament, saying that the 
Parliament legally reacted against the king’s threats to the preservation of the 
subjects. As trustees of the people, who are the author of all governments (p. 
253), the king and both Houses of Parliament hold political power which is 
aimed at the people’s fullest good. Herle understands that such an end could 
not be achieved if the King-in-Parliament were a mere natural body; on the 
contrary, it is a corporation “which dies not” (p. 240). If the natural body of the 
king detaches from his political body, Parliament is not dissolved: it continues 
to hold the political body of the king and of the kingdom. 
17  See also Parker (1644). Jus Populi.
18  See Parker (1641). 
19  Parker (1642), p. 3. See also Parker (1643): “Arbitrary power is only dangerous in one man or in 
a few men, and cannot be so in Parliaments at any times
20  Doctrines of absolute sovereignty do not conflict, therefore, with constitutional theories of 
limited government. See Hoekstra (2013), p. 1080. See also Lee (2016), who speaks about “mutual 
hostility between the competing ideals of unlimited popular self-rule and constitutionalism”, pp. 1-2.
21  On the origins of the doctrine of “reserved powers”, see Lee (2016), chap. 1 and 4.
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But – as Dr Ferne mischievously suggests – what would happen if the 
Parliament failed to discharge its duties? Would people reassume their original 
power? To avoid this unintended consequence, Herle adds that the consent given 
when the constitution is established becomes incorporated in Parliament.22 So, 
even if submitted to extreme cruelty, as the primitive Christians were (p. 256), 
the people would never have cause to resist, for they have “reserved no Power in 
themselves from themselves in Parliament” (p. 255). Yet Parliament may make 
use of its own reserved power of resistance in the name of the preservation of 
the whole kingdom to avoid absolute monarchy. Therefore, the constitutional 
principles underlying government themselves justify Parliamentary resistance 
against the king’s arbitrary rule, while preventing the people’s attempts to 
reassume a power which they no longer possess.23
The move from the theory of coordinated powers to the theory of 
sovereignty is not common ground among all parliamentarian writers. Philip 
Hunton, the author of A Treatise of Monarchy (1643), and the anonymous 
author of Touching the Fundamentall Lawes (1643), were cautious about taking 
that further step, endorsing instead the Ancient Constitution as the paramount 
law of government. For them, the Ancient Constitution assimilates not only 
English policies and customs beyond memory, but also the Roman constitutio.24 
Accordingly, the King-in-Parliament government is the supreme power in 
the commonwealth insofar as it is a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy.25 This allows Hunton and the author of Touching the Fundamentall 
Lawes to deny that the king has a negative voice. Hunton even denies that any 
of the three estates can prevail over the others, lest the excess of power of one 
estate should unbalance the government. 
These writers are well aware that a commitment to the theory of coordinated 
powers poses great difficulties, because the stability of the constitution 
ultimately rests on the cooperation among the three estates. For the author of 
Touching the Fundamentall Lawes, there is not, nor can there be, any external 
law binding the King-in-Parliament.26 If the king refuses to assent to the laws 
created by the people in Parliament, the other estates of the republic27 must 
act on behalf of the people’s safety, holding him accountable by means of the 
reserved powers they possess for the preservation of the republic. At this stage, 
22  Ferne (1642), p. 204. Herle (1642): “Parliament’s is the people’s owne consent, which once 
passed they cannot revoke”, p. 255.
23  Such a power is, according to Herle (1642), “a mere castle in the air” (p. 256).
24  The connection between Ancient Constitution and Commonwealth was suggested, oddly 
enough, by The King’s Answer to the XIX Propositions (1642).
25  [Anon] (1643), p. 267. Hunton’s account of mixed monarchy bears similarity with Polybius’ 
mixed government. See Hunton (1643), p. 24.
26  “The very Constitution itselfe is the fundamentall law of its owne preservation”([Anon], (1643), 
p. 267).
27  “if he refuse that honour which the republicke by its fundamentall constitution hath conferred 
upon him...” ([Anon], (1643), p. 274).
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when the anonymous author is about to sanction Parker’s and Herle’s theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty, he accepts somewhat ambivalently that violations 
of the constitution are also rare opportunities for the people to correct their 
government (p. 278). In a very restricted context, then, the author concedes 
that no one is superior to the body of the people, not even “their representative 
actors” (p. 279).
Hunton’s endorsement of the Ancient Constitution is even more dramatic. 
He acknowledges that in all mixed and limited government “there can be no 
constituted, legal, authoritative judge of the fundamental controversies arising 
betwixt the three estates” (p. 28). The power that one estate of the commonwealth 
has against the other abusive estate is of counterpoise and countenance, that 
is, of resistance. This does not imply, as Parker and Herle assume, that the 
estates encroached upon can take the place of the encroacher estate, nor that 
Parliament is the arbiter of the dispute among the estates, for this would make 
Parliament the supreme authority. Since the Ancient Constitution provides 
no remedy to prevent internal conflicts, its failure may lead to a condition of 
disorder that should be avoided, except if the cost to avoid it is “an intolerable 
servitude”.28 In that extreme situation, the appeal to the community outside the 
frame of government seems to Hunton the only solution to the deadlock; only 
the individual, after a careful examination of his conscience, can decide whom 
he shall obey and assist. 
Subjects can decide whom they shall support in a civil dissention because 
they are endowed with reason and judgment, faculties that presuppose patterns 
of morality and law. In virtue of the fact that their original obligation is first due 
to the laws and principles of government, and next to those in charge of their 
preservation, their moral duty is to assist those who endeavour to preserve or 
restore the constitution. Thus, comparing the actions of the king and Parliament, 
Hunton concludes that subjects should assist the Parliament, because it resisted 
the king’s arbitrariness. The appeal ad conscientiam generis humani, however, 
does not correspond to a right of resistance. The subjects have a moral, not 
political power, and they shall be judged and punished in accordance with the 
laws of the kingdom if they resist a supposedly arbitrary action by Parliament.
III
From 1645 to 1647 John Lilburne was imprisoned in Newgate for 
writing pamphlets deemed seditious and contrary to the “fundamental laws 
and government” of the kingdom. His attitude in court also contributed to the 
conviction. In defiance of the Lords’ prerogative and superior rank, Lilburne 
28  Hunton (1644), p. 9, 38. Pocock (1975), pp. 368- 370.
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refused to take off his hat, to bend before his judges and to answer to the 
interrogatories, thus showing that they had no jurisdiction over him. Richard 
Overton, who was likewise incarcerated in 1646 by order of the Lords for 
printing Lilburne’s pamphlets and writing in his defence, also refused to answer 
the interrogatories from the judges, arguing that nobody is bound to accuse 
himself. Explaining his reasons for the confrontation, Overton asserted that his 
case against the Lords is of “the same nature with that of the Parliament against 
the king”. 29 At first sight, the phrase may suggest that during those years the 
campaigns of “defensive resistance”30 against the Lords were grounded on 
the very same arguments employed by parliamentarian writers against the 
king’s arbitrary power. This is only partially correct. We can attain a more 
complete understanding of the phenomenon of resistance against parliamentary 
absolutism if we fully accept Overton’s contention that his enmity was “onely 
against tyranny … whether in Emperor, King, Prince, Parliament, Presbyters, 
or People”.31
The Lord’s prerogatives were challenged from two connected standpoints. 
The first was based on the idea that the Lords were not representatives of the 
people because they were never, Lilburne writes, “instituted and empowered by 
the Commons of England”.32 In the same vein, Overton claims that obedience 
“in all things just, lawful, honest and reasonable” is due only to those that were 
chosen by the people, that is, to knights and burgess assembled in Parliament. 
While the House of Commons was instituted by choice and consent, agrees 
Walwyn, the Lords are “no natural issues of laws, but the exuberances and 
mushrooms of prerogatives”. These writers are convinced that the prerogative 
of the House of Lords to exert judicial power in the kingdom must be 
denounced for being just as arbitrary as the legislative power of the king and 
the clergymen.33 
Second, the resistance to the judicial power of the Lords drew heavily on 
the Magna Carta, especially chapter 29, and Edward Coke’s gloss of the same 
chapter. In Lilburne’s view, that chapter guarantees that in criminal causes a 
commoner shall be tried only by his equals and according to common law. 
Lilburne maintains that neither of these conditions was met during his trial, 
which he takes to be unquestionable proof that the Lords treated him as already 
convicted. Overton, for his turn, quotes the Magna Carta and Coke’s Institutes 
to remind his judges that no warrant was produced before he and his wife were 
dragged out of their houses and into the streets, their small children being left 
29  Overton (1646a); Lilburne (1646a); Overton (1646b); Overton (1646c)
30  Lilburne (1647).
31  Overton (1645).
32  Lilburne (1646a), p. 11.
33  Overton (1646b). Walwyn (1646).
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alone, in an unequivocal violation of their right to their bodies and possessions.34 
In face of the unjustified violence his family and he suffered, Overton seeks 
refuge in the same laws and statutes that were earlier invoked against the king’s 
prerogatives by those who were prosecuted by the Star Chamber and the High 
Commission in the 1630’s. His purpose is to make clear that such prerogative, 
as well as any discretionary power, is an evil in itself; it is therefore useless to 
abolish the offices or to eliminate the persons who retain the power without 
limiting the power itself. 
Which principles lay behind the attack on the Lords’ prerogatives? 
In Lilburne’s The Freeman’s Freedom Vindicated, it is the idea that all men 
and women, as God’s creatures, are “by nature all equal and alike in power, 
dignity, authority, and majesty”. Since God does not create ranks or hierarchies, 
everyone has the same power or dominion over him or herself and over others. 
As this principle remains valid within political and social life, any increase 
of power that results in the government of one or more persons over others 
not only depends on “mutual agreement or consent”, but also must aim at the 
benefit of those who consent. Otherwise, there would be a state of voluntary 
servitude, which Lilburne characterizes as “unnatural, irrational, sinful, 
wicked, unjust, devilish, and tyrannical”, because it subverts the order designed 
by God.35 Consequent to the principle of equality and government by consent 
is Lilburne’s controversial contention that “the poorest that lives hath a true 
right to give a vote, as well as the richest and greatest”, which was echoed in 
1647 during the debates at Putney by Colonel Rainborough, and endorsed by 
John Wildman and Edward Sexby. They sum up the demand for universal male 
suffrage by saying that the only way to avoid a servile condition is to ensure 
that “every man that is to live under the government” submits, by his own 
consent, to the government.36
Lilburne’s conception of equality derives from the premise that absolute 
sovereignty belongs exclusively to God: “[God] is circumscribed, governed, 
and limited by no rules, but doth all things merely and only by His sovereign 
will and unlimited good pleasure”.37 Only God is sovereign; everyone else is 
subject to His will. Being naturally limited, men’s power and will can lawfully 
command only limited obedience. So The Freeman’s Freedom Vindicated stages 
a conflict between antipodes. On one hand, there is the free man, that is, the one 
who is not subject to anybody’s will other than God’s,38 and his representative, 
understood as a deputy or trustee. In opposition to them, there is the person 
who transgresses the principle of natural equality and as a consequence agrees 
34  Lilburne (1646a); Overton (1646b), Overton (1646c).
35  Lilburne (1646a), pp. 11-12.
36  The Putney Debates. In: Sharp (1998), p. 131.
37  Lilburne (1646), The Free-mans Freedom Vindicated. A Poscript; p. 11.
38  Like Lilburne, who is free, although in the prison of Newgate.
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to submit to someone who possesses a God-like absolute power, being able to 
destroy her at will. The moral of the story is that the representative does not 
have a status above that of the person represented; implicitly, this means that 
the abuse of authority, or attempt to treat the represented like a slave, justifies 
taking up arms against whosoever has thus become a tyrant. 
As early as 1645, John Wildman had already made the same contention 
in England’s Miserie and Remedie, which is a complaint against Lilburne’s 
imprisonment. Wildman understands that only God can exert an arbitrary 
power, that is, a power based on His will. From this premise, Wildman is able to 
draw two inferences: that every human authority is circumscribed by law, and 
that any person who does not recognize limitations to her jurisdiction is in fact 
a God’s imitator, and should be punished as a tyrant, an enemy to humankind. 
What applies to a prince necessarily applies to a representative body, even more 
because the latter is but a servant to them that empower it, the people. As the 
supreme authority, the people never delegated the power to check the abuses 
and exorbitances of representatives. Invoking his Roman references, Wildman 
mentions Gaius Flamminius, who used to address to the multitude whenever 
he wanted to remind the Senators that they were only commissioned to serve 
the republic. The same occurs in England, says Wildman, where the appeal to 
the people is a means to teach the members of Parliament about the power that 
is above them.39 
Overton reaches a similar conclusion in An Arrow against all Tyrants. For 
him, tyranny causes such degradation of the human condition that the person 
who is subject to it ceases to be herself and becomes someone’s else, as a beast 
of burden; the tyrant or usurper, in turn, by appropriating something that does 
not belong to him, transforms into “thief and robber to his kind” (p. 243). What 
is at stake in An Arrow against all Tyrants is the principle of self-property, 
which Overton equates to natural liberty: “By natural birth all men are equally 
and alike born to like propriety, liberty and freedom (...)” (p. 243).40
This natural condition of freedom, propriety or birthright is the right to 
enjoy oneself without being invaded or usurped by others. Overton’s assumption 
is that preservation being the purpose of human life, no one may either abuse us 
or allow another to do so; if it happens, we are endowed by God and nature with 
the means, or rights, to avoid the assault that could convert us into slaves, that 
is, into the property of others. In its negative formulation, the principle of self-
property reads that “No man has power over my rights and liberties, and I over 
39  Wildman (1645).
40  “To every individual in nature is given an individual property by nature not to be invaded 
or usurped by any. For every one, as he is himself, so he has a self-propriety, else could he not 
be himself”. (Overton (1646c). For Skinner, there is a general theory of liberty underpinning the 
arguments of Overton, as well as, say, Ireton and Harrington. According to this theory, to be free, one 
must not be at the mercy of an arbitrary will, and this is only possible for those who have the means 
to provide for their own survival (Skinner (2006), p.162).
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no man’s”. The reason why nobody may usurp my self-property and I also may 
not usurp another’s self-property is that there is no such thing as an absolute 
right in nature. Self-property is limited: “For as by nature no man may abuse, 
beat, torment, or afflict himself, so by nature no man may give that power to 
another, seeing he may not do it himself” (p. 243). Interestingly, Overton does 
not deny that one has the capacity to subdue another or to yield to another; 
he does deny that from the power to act as usurper or beast of burden follows 
the right to do so. Facts do not create rights or morality. The consequence of 
transgressing the moral boundaries God has set for his creatures is the loss of 
the liberty that enables us to be ourselves, that is, humans.41
The focus on representation stems from the principle of self-property. In 
order to enter someone’s property and share it, one must have “free consent 
from him whose natural right and freedom it is”. Consent is free as long as it is 
rational, that is, as long it is not obtained by force or fraud. Incidentally, fraud 
can be a much more effective means of achieving obedience than recourse to 
violence. In a bitter narrative of England’s past, Overton remarks that the “poor 
deceived people” cannot feel on their necks the Norman Yoke that was put 
on them by many generations of kings, Lords, and clergymen, “because they 
are even bestialized in their understandings (…), they are even degenerated 
from being men, and unman’d (…)”.42 As the compliance of the people with 
their tyrants suggests, consent is necessary but not sufficient to establish a 
just government. Another condition is required: the government must be 
representative. 
Representation is a particular case of consent, through which someone 
empowers another person, creating a legal authority for a limited end – the 
safeguard of self-property and people’s safety. While alienation of power entails 
the loss of self-property, representation is a communication of power, so that 
the representative does not truly own political power, being instead a deputy, 
commissioner or delegate.43 The representative is accordingly a creation of 
those whom he represents; in Overton’s metaphor, he is but a shadow, and “that 
which goes beyond the substance and shadow of a thing cannot possibly be the 
thing itself either substantially or virtually”(p. 251).44 As the power to create 
and undo the representative belongs to the represented, the former does not exist 
in separation from, nor act independently from the represented, contrariwise 
to Parker’s contention that, having being incorporated by the Parliament, the 
people cannot withdraw themselves from their representatives. For Overton, 
41  Foxley points out that Overton’s reasoning is greatly indebt to Walwyn’s “requirement to 
preserve oneself from moral self-destruction through sin”, which was expressed in A Help to the Right 
Understanding, from February 1645. See Foxley (2013), p. 136.
42  Overton (1646b), p. 2.
43  The doctrine of communication was advanced by Althusius. See Salmon (1959). 
44  The metaphor of the representative as a shadow is a favourite among Levellers. See also Lilburne 
(1645); Walwyn, William (1646b). 
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representation must come to an end when the representative goes beyond the 
represented.45 
The same rule extends to the House of Commons, which is instituted “by 
contraction of those [the free people] several individual communications”. 
Indeed, the principle of limited self-property is the basis of the limitation of 
any representative government, insofar as it establishes a boundary between 
what can and what cannot be represented. Religious toleration is the first and 
main instance of this idea, as we can see in A Remonstrance of Many Thousand 
Citizens (1646): “we have no power from us to doe [compel for the well-
being], nor could you have; for wee could not confer a power that was not in 
ourselves”. This thinking resonates from Walwyn’s principle that Christians 
can worship God only “according to their understandings and consciences”. 
As no one has the power to bind oneself in good conscience to an opinion that 
one does not believe in, there is “no compulsive power in matters of Religion”, 
every one being “free in the worship and service of God”. Religious opinions 
are therefore completely out of the scope of representation.46
Nevertheless, Overton’s analysis of the status of the House of Commons 
is rather ambiguous, which calls into question who ultimately owns political 
power, that is, who holds sovereignty. Considering the principles from which 
Overton derives his views on representation, the most reasonable answer would 
be that each person individually and the people as a collective are the origin 
and source of all political power. Yet Overton asserts, “the commons of this 
nation […] empowered their body representative […] with their own absolute 
sovereignty”. He goes on explaining that the people “conveyed and issued to 
their proper representers” a “natural sovereignty”. Despite the centrality of the 
principle of limited self-property, these lines may mislead us to think that the 
individuals yield their absolute sovereignty to the House of Commons, who 
thus becomes sovereign.
As may be apparent by now, Overton employs the term “absolute” in 
different ways. First, “absolute power” is a synonym for tyranny. Repudiating 
all absolutist theories, from parliamentarian to patriarchalist ones, Overton even 
rejects that parents have, metaphorically or literally, “absolute unlimited power 
[…] over their children as to do to them as they list”. However, by “absolute 
sovereign” Overton means also “chief ruler”, “chief magistrate” or supreme 
executioner of the laws”, epithets that were employed by parliamentarian and 
Independent writers to refer to the position held by the king. Finally, “absolute 
power” may refer, paradoxically, to the liberty to act in order to preserve 
freedom. The House of Commons is said to have an absolute power in virtue 
45  That is an “accountability view” of representation, according to Pitkin’s categories (Pitkin 
(1972).
46  Walwyn (1645a); Walwyn (1646a); Overton (1646d) p. 12. 
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of its capacity to make or abrogate laws aiming at the people’s protection. 
Thus, the Parliament has absolute legislative power, in contrast to any form of 
arbitrary power, that is, any power that is neither representative nor authorized 
by laws. The key word here is “communication”, quoted above. Communication 
supposes a dynamic connection among individuals as well as between each 
individual and the body representative. Absolute sovereign power may be 
depicted, therefore, as a constant flow of right from those who own power to 
their commissioners. Thanks to representation, the sovereignty of the people 
does not exclude the sovereignty of the House of Commons; on the contrary, 
one requires the other. In all cases, if representation is the main the criterion 
for a legitimate exercise of political authority, king and Lords are excluded 
from government; the House of Commons becomes supreme, concentrating 
the legislative, judiciary and executive power of the nation.47 It would not be 
unlikely, though, that from the seat of supreme power, the House of Commons 
could claim to be the seat of absolute sovereignty in the absence of any superior 
power controlling its actions.
Lilburne responds to such a possibility by invoking the supremacy of the 
law. As early as 1645, he was promoting the rule of law against the rule of will 
in an attempt to emphasize that Parliament was bound, like anybody else, by 
the declared and established law. He argues that Parliament is commissioned to 
make and abrogate laws as long as these laws were in accordance with Equity 
or the spirit of Law. And Parliament may be deemed the supreme power as 
long as it follows Equity; otherwise, no one is obligated to it. To those who 
might be sceptical about the right meaning of Equity, Lilburne notices that it 
is expressed in the letter of many laws, like the Magna Carta, for instance, and 
is always identical with the public good. Without Equity, concludes Lilburne, 
there would be no meum et tuum.48 
Whereas Lilburne believes that the law of Equity conveyed through the 
Magna Carta was obligatory and could save the free people from the tyranny 
of Parliament, Walwyn discredits the entire doctrine of the Magna Carta. For 
him, not only does the greatest part of the Carta addresses insignificant matters 
related to hunting, it also deals with rights and liberties that are completely 
ignored by Parliament. As Walwyn observes, parliamentary writers maintain 
that Parliament is above the Magna Carta, is unbounded by its own laws, and 
can dispose of the subjects’ lives and properties at its own pleasure, simply 
because it was chosen by the people and allegedly entrusted with their safety.49 
Moreover, there are no courts or judges who could enforce the law of Equity 
against the tyranny of Parliament, because all the legal authorities in England are 
47  Lilburne (1646); Overton (1646b). See also Lilburne & Overton (1646): “The House of 
Commons [is] the supreme and legal power and judicature in England”. 
48  Lilburne (1645).
49  Walwyn (1645b), pp. 3-6
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the offspring of the Norman Conquest. Also making the case for the supremacy 
of law, Overton argues that justice cannot depend on “the crooked course of 
favour”. To beg for one’s own right, according to him, “is a disfranchising of 
myself, and an acknowledgement that the thing is not my own, but at another 
man’s pleasure”.50 Yet, while Overton seems to have no choice but to appeal 
to the House of Commons for Equity, Walwyn relies on “the honest and plaine 
men of England” for attaining the “greatest safety” that is “found in open and 
universal justice”.51 As I hope to show below, any support for the House of 
Commons gives way, however hesitatingly, in 1647 to the confidence Walwyn 
placed on the agency of free people.
It now seems opportune to emphasize some discontinuities between the 
arguments employed by these three pamphleteers and the parliamentarian 
doctrines. I argued above that both lineages of parliamentarian doctrines 
operate, initially at least, within the frame of the Ancient Constitution. The 
doctrine of parliamentarian absolutism extrapolates from that frame by 
introducing the idea that the people originally consented to be represented by 
and in Parliament for the sake of their protection from tyranny. Representation 
is seen as a mechanism to create a political or institutionalized people in lieu 
of the unorganized and tumultuous people outside Parliament. This implies: 
1) that the representative is essentially superior to and independent of the 
represented, who is left with no political power after consent; 2) that the 
people are sovereign only in Parliament, which can therefore exert an arbitrary 
and legitimate power. By contrast, the Levellers’ arguments do not explore 
the limits and failures of the Ancient Constitution. Although Lilburne and 
Overton bring into their defence the Magna Carta, they are more interested in 
a Cokean kind of juridical reasoning, so to speak, than in the doctrine of the 
King-in-Parliament, which is considered a heritage of the Norman Conquest. 
What they really advocate for is the supremacy of law as a limitation on any 
government whatsoever. And although Walwyn, Lilburne and Overton develop 
a link between consent and representation, they strongly repudiate the idea that 
representation entails a complete loss of equality and liberty. In their effort to 
delegitimize any claim to absolute arbitrary power, they assert that absolute 
power is necessarily non-representative. They explicitly deny that Parliament 
is the people – as the shadow cannot be the thing itself; rather, Parliament is 
subservient to the people’s security and protection from tyranny. Implicitly, 
they deny that representation is the only mechanism by which the people may 
acquire a political being. This is why Walwyn appeals to the people not as the 
50  Overton (1646b), p. 6.
51  Overton (1646b), p. 5. See also Walwyn (1645b): “The honest and plaine men of England [...] 
shall be your Judges, and will [...] not suffer a haire of your head to be touched, nor any reproach to 
be stucke upon your good name, but you shall live and be an honour to your Nation in the hearts of all 
honest and well affected men”, pp. 7-8.
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moral potency behind the constitution, like Hunton, but rather as the political 
power able to transform and control institutions and policies. The remaining 
part of this paper turns more directly to the people outside Parliament, who the 
Levellers conceived as the original, end and bearer of sovereignty.
IV
In July 1646, the Presbyterian members of the Parliament drafted the 
Newcastle Propositions as the basis for the peace treaty with Charles I. The 
document proposed the restoration of the king to the English throne, the imposition 
of a Presbyterian state church, and the reversion of the New Model Army to the 
king’s control. For many people, amongst them the authors of A Remonstrance 
of Many Thousand Citizens, the negotiations between the Presbyterian members 
of the Parliament and the king were a betrayal of the cause of liberty. Identifying 
themselves as “citizens and other free-borne people of England”, the authors of 
the Remonstrance spoke on behalf of the people to remind “their owne House of 
Commons” (p. 3) of its duty to deliver them “from all kinds of bondage”, thus 
making clear that such peace treaty would never be in the interest of those who 
fought for liberty of conscience during the civil war. What the Remonstrance was 
keen to emphasize was the nature of the trust bestowed by the people on the body 
representative for their “peace and happiness”. 
Although the notion of trust can be found in earlier pamphlets, the recurrent 
use of the term in the Remonstrance suggests that there is something else at 
play. In the Remonstrance, the tensions within the political community are 
narrated through the process of trust in, and distrust of, the House of Commons. 
The more objective and instrumental categories of consent and election do 
not encompass the condition that accounts both for the power that the House 
of Commons acquired in the beginning of the war, and for its loss of moral 
authority due to the possibility of a peace settlement with the king. Trust and its 
antithesis distrust involve an affective and temporal dimension.52 In this sense, 
the Remonstrance shows how the trust in the House of Commons was first 
founded on the opinion that knights and burgess had the same interests as the 
commons of England, and thence that the arbitrary power personified in the king 
was a common enemy. The hope to live free “from all kind of exorbitancies” 
(p. 5) in the nearest future helped to create a bond through mutual obligations. 
So, in order to fight the oppression, the House of Commons was granted a 
power that came directly from the willingness of many people to sacrifice their 
callings, belongings, families, and their lives for the common interest. 
52  Dunn (1996), p. 95.
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But the people did not devote themselves unconditionally to Parliament. 
Their fidelity and love were based on the expectation of fair dealing and 
just treatment.53 Fair dealing excludes any attempts to corrupt the people’s 
understanding, as instantiated by the Norman rhetoric of the King-in-Parliament, 
and even the Magna Carta itself, which in the Remonstrance is conceived of as 
“a beggarly thing”(p. 15). Whereas fair dealing requires the recognition that the 
people are rational and able to break with the past if necessary, just treatment 
entails the recognition of civil equality. In order to deserve the trust of the people, 
the House of Commons was expected to treat everyone as equal, regardless of 
degrees, wealth or persons. Such expectations, however, were utterly frustrated. 
From the moment that Parliament employed the servile language of “the king 
can doe no wrong” to excuse the king for the war, invoking the Solemn League 
and Covenant to protect him, the whole edifice upon which trust was built 
began to collapse. The breakdown of reciprocity was succeeded by political 
disenchantment, leading to the point at which the authors of the Remonstrance 
had to warn their representatives that, according to the “established constitution 
of this commonwealth”, their mandates could be “but for one year at the most”(p. 
3). If they remained in power longer, it was only because the people still relied on 
them. Gradually, however, trust is being eroded. 
Distrust characterizes many of the feelings towards Parliament from 1646 to 
1649.54 The rank and file soldiers of the New Model Army were amongst the most 
aggrieved by the groundless hopes raised by Parliament. In The Case of the Army 
truly Stated (1647), their agents (adjutators or agitators) complain about the direct 
effects that the peace treaty had on the Army and the people as a whole: The army 
would be dismissed without payment of their arrears and without any provisions 
for immunity from prosecutions for acts committed during the war; no indemnity 
would be provided for wounded soldiers, widows and orphans; an expeditionary 
force drawn on the New Model’s rank would be sent to Ireland. For people who are 
already burdened with tithes, monopolies, and taxation; subjected to committees 
and courts composed of Lords; threatened with imprisonment for debts, the treaty 
means the continuity of a policy of exclusion “from managing state-affairs”. But 
the authors and signatories of The Case of the Army truly Stated were not willing 
to cooperate with those plans, proving thereby that distrust may also prompt one 
to political action.55 At that juncture, the most urgent action was the dissolution of 
the Parliament assembled since 1640 and the election of a new representative body, 
a demand that is heavily stressed in the versions of the Agreement of the People.56
53  “And doe you (because of our readiness to comply with your desires in all things) conceive us so 
sottish as to be contented with such unworthy returnes or our trust and love?” (Overton (1646d), p. 6).
54  Walwyn (1647). 
55  “There is little probability of any good without some more speedy and vigorous action”. The 
Case of the Army truly Stated (1647). See Woolrych (2001). 
56  I partially endorse Vernon and Baker’s contention that the first Agreement emerged from the 
discussions of soldiers and agitators in the Army, led by Wildman (Vernon & Baker (2010). On the other 
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The urge for renewal of Parliament was part of a much wider purpose 
to determine the role and extension of the political power, allowing no room 
for “the exercise of an unlimited or arbitrary power”.57 As specified in the 
Agreement of the Free People (1649), the supreme authority of the country 
must consist of 400 members elected. As the supreme power of the nation, 
Parliament is entrusted with the legislative power (to make or repeal laws) 
and with the executive power (to raise revenues and to make peace or war 
with foreign countries). Yet its authority is subordinate to the people and to an 
inalterable law that entrenches a written constitution, the Agreement itself.58 
The Agreement was a foundational document for the reconstitution of a 
political society devastated by civil war. Its formal structure resembled that of 
ancient charters of cities, whose goal, recalls Lilburne in London’s Liberty in 
Chains Discovered (1646), was to avoid that the “government should become a 
tyranny”. Lilburne goes on explaining that these “first Constitutions” provided 
that “all Officers and Magistrates should be elective By Votes and Approbation 
of the free people of each City; and no longer to continue then a yeare”. 59 As 
in the past this proviso was meant to protect the free people; in the present it 
aims at recovering birthrights that were lost in the course of the struggle against 
the Norman Conquer and his heirs. Nonetheless, we should not overstate the 
traditionalism of the Agreement and its appeal to customary ways, for this may 
lead us to neglect the novelty of some of its claims,60 a novelty that was clearly 
perceived by Ireton and Cromwell at Putney on 29th October 1647. From the 
viewpoint of both army officers, the expansion of the franchise and the distribution 
of seats in parliament according to population (Article I of An Agreement of the 
People, 164761) would result in the ruin of Ancient Constitution, which restrained 
participation in the legislature to the freeholders. Petty, Sexby, Wildman and 
Rainborough were ready to accept a new constitution and to break with the past, 
for they considered the previous acts of consent to not be mandatory in cases in 
which fundamental rights or liberties are violated. In this sense, the Agreement 
might be conceptualized as a constitution in modern terms.62
hand, Foxley is correct to insist that the Levellers may have had a hand in the first Agreement, since there 
are many phrasings and patterns of thought similar with earlier pamphleteers who would become the 
leaders of the Levellers (Foxley (2013), pp. 150-159.
57  An Agreement of the Free People (1649), p. 2. In this analysis I give priority to this version of 
the Agreement, the most authentically Leveller. See Peacey (2012), p. 58.
58  Vernon & Baker (2010), p. 13.
59  Lilburne, John (1646b), p. 281. See Orr (2012), p. 77.
60  The innovative character of the Agreements is controversial. Dzelzainis argues that the Levellers 
simply defended the restoration of ancient liberties comprised in the Ancient Constitution, “rather than 
proposing blueprints to a new system” (Dzelzainis (2005), pp. 269-287. See also Orr (2012).
61  “That the people of England being at this day very unequally distributed by counties, cities and 
boroughs for the election of their deputies in parliament, ought to be more indifferently proportioned 
according to the number of the inhabitants...”(An Agreement of the People. p. 94. 
62  That is, “an act whereby a people frees itself (or themselves) from custom and imposes a new form 
of association on itself by an act of will, reason and agreement” (Tully (1995). Strange Multiplicity: p. 60).
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This new form of association aimed at ensuring popular sovereignty by 
means of a complex set of devices that enable and limit the powers available 
to any representative or institutional body. In effect, the Agreement begins 
highlighting mechanisms of accountability and responsibility: Annual elections 
as well as the prohibition of consecutive re-election to prevent factions and 
to remind office-holders that they are not the real owners of the office.63 It is 
assumed that frequent elections and the short terms of mandates can bestow 
legitimacy to an elected government, but also that the government thus elected 
should be put under the permanent control of the people.64 These devices were 
meant to give trust and distrust an expression in the constitution, being part 
of an effort to impose control over the political process and a political form 
of interaction in the public space.65 Therefore, popular participation was not 
limited to the right to vote in regular elections; it was equally required to police 
the protection to reserved rights.
A second group of devices was intended to safeguard individual and 
collective powers that are not, nor can be, entrusted to representatives or to 
anybody else, as matters of conscience; the right to equal submission to law, 
irrespective of wealth or social position, with the consequent elimination of all 
political and legal privileges; the power to “constrain any person to serve in way 
by sea or land — every man’s conscience being to be satisfied in the justness of 
that cause wherein he hazards his own life, or may destroy another’s” (p. 3).66 As 
already discussed, these reserved powers aimed at the person’s moral integrity, 
drawing a line between legitimate and illegitimate rule.67 Any transgression of 
this line should be punishable with the death penalty – like “murder or other the 
like heinous offences destructive to human society”, or attempts “by force to 
destroy this our Agreement” (p. 4). Unsurprisingly, capital punishment was to 
be applied in these two cases alone, evidence that the Levellers hesitated about 
the employment of violence, even when it was supposedly required. Their past 
and present experiences had taught them that the boundary between coercive 
power and arbitrary power is often a thin one.
Several clauses of the Agreement of the Free People were also dedicated 
to issues of criminal justice, reflecting the Levellers’ preoccupations with the 
need to separate the formulation and the application of criminal laws, as well 
as with procedures for judicial independence.68 The legislative was not to have 
any power to make laws concerning the death penalty - except in the cases 
of murder or high treason mentioned above -; nor might it have the right to 
63  Harrington makes a similar claim. Harrington, James (1996), p. 33.
64  Tuck, Richard (1993), pp. 242-243; Scott. (2000), p. 283.
65  I draw here on Rosanvallon (2008).
66  Foxley (2013). p. 136. 
67  As Skinner eloquently summarizes the reasoning, “any social arrangements under which our 
birthright is forfeited must for that reason be illegitimate”(Skinner (2006), p. 163).
68  Loughlin (2007), p. 20
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take away “men’s lives, limbs, liberties and estates … upon trivial or slight 
occasions”; likewise, in criminal laws, punishments should be proportionate 
to the offences. Further measures were prescribed to prevent personal 
administration of justice that amounts to arbitrariness: That nobody be sent 
to prison before conviction and condemnation; that the Lords have the same 
power to commit the commoners to prison as the commoners have to commit 
them69; that the jury in criminal cases should be composed of twelve persons 
“of the neighbourhood to be chosen in some free way by the people”; and that 
nobody be deprived of defence witnesses.70 
Finally, the Agreements emerged from practices of popular participation 
and were intended to reinvigorate popular sovereignty thanks to election in 
different levels of government. The Agreement of Free People, in particular, 
expressed the Levellers’ commitments to a decentralized political society. 
Local governments remained out of the reach of the central power, orienting 
their interests rather autonomously.71 Accordingly, the Levellers propose the 
abolition of central courts and the transfer of criminal and civil jurisdiction 
to local hundreds courts. Despite being supreme, the Parliament’s authority is 
also blocked from intervening in local religious and political activities, like the 
direct choice of ministers in the parishes, and the election of “any public officer 
upon any counties, hundreds, cities, towns or boroughs”. The state envisaged 
by the Levellers was dispersed in self-determined communities.
It might be tempting to associate the urge for the decentralization of power 
and political participation to the Levellers’ attachment to the theory of mixed 
constitution or divided powers. The truth is quite the opposite: The Levellers’ 
call for unicameralism was rooted in the assumption of equality among voters. 
They thus conceived the legislature as necessarily composed by one sole element, 
not of two or three - a model of government that would be later criticized by 
Harrington for being simple and more susceptible to corruption. The Levellers, 
in contrast, repudiated mixed government thoroughly, associating it more with 
the Norman Yoke than with republican Rome. In The Bloody Project, Walwyn 
scornfully suggests that mixed government is at best impractical and at worse a 
play among factions. If Parliament was composed by the Lords Spiritual, Lords 
Temporal and Commons, as it was firstly held, then the exclusion of the bishops 
69  Instructions agreed upon as the sence of the Petitioners of Buckinghampshire and Hartford 
Shire, 1646. 
70  See also Certain articles for the good of the commonwealth (1647). An insightful study on the 
arguments employed by the Levellers advocating the importance of juries rights can be found in 
Greene (1985). According to Greene, “The “jury right” was more than just another Leveller reform 
item: the supposed right lay at the very heart of Leveller political and social theory, and at least 
in its theoretical implications the right involved the gravest threat that the Levellers posed to the 
governments of the Interregnum (p. 154)
71  Davis (2007). Baker argues that Levellers’ “decentralist agenda was influenced by civic practice” 
(Baker (2012), p. 106.
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serves as proof that the three elements were not equal; whereas if it is assumed 
that Parliament is composed by king, Lords and Commons, the war against the 
king cannot be taken as the assent of the king to the war. If two states agree, 
they can exclude the third; if they do not agree, then “nothing can be done, 
which in government is ridiculous to imagine” (p. 9). Lilburne, in turn, gives 
rather ironic support to the King-in-Parliament policy vis-à-vis the government 
of the Rump, saying that it was the Levellers’ interest “to keep up one tyrant to 
balance another, till we certainly knew what that tyrant that pretended fairest 
would give us as our freedom”.72 This assertion sounds like a hopeless bet that 
the monarchy could destroy the violent oligarchy of the Army. It is also an 
expression of disillusionment with the promises of a free England.
Now, while the Agreements conveyed the idea of an inalterable law that 
enables and simultaneously constrains the legislative, judicial and executive 
powers, they also shed light on the community that is supposed to make those 
engagements. In effect, who are the “we, the free people of England” that agree 
on the terms of the paramount law, accepting thereby to establish constraints 
on themselves73?
In a broader sense, the free people of England who are “capable of 
subjection as well as rule” refer initially to all men “born in the realm”, as 
mentioned in chapter 29 of the Magna Carta so often quoted by Lilburne.74 
This seems to be the sense employed in The Agreement of the People (1647), 
which calls for the support of all “countrymen”. Who should be counted as 
citizens, though, was a highly disputed issue during the debates at Putney. 
Colonel Thomas Rainborough, John Wildman and Edward Sexby contended 
that all Englishmen, by the mere fact that they were born in the country, “ought 
to have a voice in elections”. In turn, Maximilliam Petty, Thomas Reade, and 
Nathaniel Rich argued that the citizens were “all inhabitants that have not 
lost their birthright”, excluding thereby servants and beggars because they 
would not be able to express their vote independently. This is the opinion that 
prevails in the Foundations of Freedom and An Agreement of the Free People, 
where the citizens are all men over 21 years old, with the exception of those 
“servants or receiving alms or having served the late king in arms or voluntary 
contributions”.75 Although more exclusive than the first version, it is nonetheless 
72 “That there should be either three or two distinct states equally supreme is an absurd nullity in 
government” Walwyn (1648), pp. 8-9; Lilburne (1649).
73 “…we the free people of England, to whom God hath given hearts, means and opportunity to 
effect the same, do with submission to His wisdom, in His name, and desiring the equity thereof 
may be to His praise and glory, agree to ascertain our government, to abolish all arbitrary power and 
to set bounds and limits both to our supreme and all subordinate authority, and remove all known 
grievances” (An Agreement of the Free People, 1649).
74  Thomas (1974), p. 75. There are indications that in some cases women would also be considered 
the people. See The Large Petition of the Levellers (1647) and Petition of Women, Affecters and 
Approvers of the Petition of Sept. 11, 1648. See also Foxley (2004). 
75  The Putney Debates. (1647), pp. 102-130.
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far more inclusive than the proposal offered by Ireton and Cromwell at Putney, 
where they were keen to maintain the privilege of being a representative for 
those with a “permanent fixed interest in this kingdom”. According to them, 
permanent interest is granted by birthright, freehold or ownership, since only 
the freeholders actually agree to defend their country under any circumstances 
and to strive for its prosperity. The Army agents and Levellers, however, could 
not accept that they had risked their lives and families for the country only to 
remain subjects. The mere fact of having fought for the country was sufficient 
to demonstrate that soldiers and other political activists were the people, and 
have accordingly the necessary attributes for political participation: An interest 
in the country’s freedom against arbitrary power. The extensive practices of 
petitioning and pamphleteering would thus serve as proof that the multitude 
could enter into political arena as citizens.
 If we analyse this last point in more detail, we see that the “we the people” 
or “all sort of people” are, first, the inhabitants of cities, counties and the nation. 
But the people are also a multitude in a Hobbesian sense: A multiplicity of 
persons “with a diversity of opinions and interests” (XVI, p. 115).76 Instead of 
“the rabble”, “the brutish multitude” that instilled fears of social dissolution, 
the Levellers assumed that the each individual of the multitude or people was 
rational for being able “to save, defend, and deliver himself from all oppression, 
violence and cruelty whatsoever”.77 As they are born into a complex society, 
they develop different opinions, doctrines, sentiments; they have different 
interests. They are evidently liable to errors and may therefore hold erroneous 
opinions concerning religion, liberty and knowledge. From thence they are 
prone to violence; otherwise they are capable of correcting their errors by 
means of persuasion. Consequently they are also capable of debate, deliberation 
on public issues and devotion to the welfare of the country. The people are a 
society of persons composed by distinct social and political groups that may or 
may not agree depending on contingencies. 
Although they conceived of the people as the single source of political 
authority, they did not attribute to the people a single will. The multiplicity of 
opinions and ways of life rendered the people a heterogeneous body, allowing 
one social or political group to check the power of another. The political arena 
was therefore considered as a domain of contingency and conflict. This may 
seem paradoxical, however. Is it reasonable to identify in the people the locus 
of sovereignty and deny that the people act as result of a single unity?78 The 
solution to the puzzle lies in the Levellers’ refusal to conceive of the people 
as a philosophical abstraction - perhaps, we may conjecture, because they 
76  Hobbes (1997). 
77  Overton (1647). p. 325).
78  See Rosanvallon (2008), p. 292.
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understand the idea of a single will as a principle springing up from absolutist 
fountains, or perhaps because they see as absurd the idea of an abstract people. 
This is not to say, however, that the people cannot act as a collective agent. As 
Lilburne explains, “the Agreement of the People, begun and ended amongst 
the people, can never come justly within the Parliament’s cognizance to 
destroy” .79 The Agreement constitutes the people that shall occupy the space 
of sovereignty. 80 This is not a God-like sovereign; nor sovereignty is expressed 
as a transcendent right, since the constitution encompasses each individual’s 
substantive moral constraint to resist arbitrary power wherever it is.81 Either 
way, absolute or arbitrary right is an oxymoron. A people or a majority that 
acts outside the laws would have power to undo the constitution, but still their 
actions would be completely devoid of authority or legitimacy.
V
From 1647 on, the Levellers were largely attacked on defamatory and 
polemical grounds. Their most active adversary was Marchmont Nedham, the 
editor of the royalist newsbook Mercurius Pragmaticus.82 Even after changing 
allegiances to become the editor of the republican Mercurius Politicus, Nedham 
continued to insist that the Levellers’ “wild project” of “popular or democratic 
government” was the “greatest enemy to liberty”. Whenever the inconstant, 
ignorant, irrational, licentious, and voluble multitude got power in their hands, 
says Nedham, they behaved as the most violent and unpredictable tyrant.83
Nedham was not alone in his distrust of popular government for the 
supposedly irrationality, volubility and lack of judgment of the multitude, which 
would render them completely unable to exercise political power84. Political 
theorists as distinct as Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington equally shared 
an unfavourable assessment of the common people’s political abilities. For 
Hobbes, a common power is created when the multitude “is made One Person” 
(XVI, 114), that is, when each individual consents and “acknowledge[s] himself 
79  Lilburne (1648), p. 351. 
80  See Loughlin (2014), p. 228; Loughlin (2007). p. 21. I disagree with Loughlin, though, in that 
“the political power is generated only when “the people” is differentiated from the existential reality 
of a mass of particular people (the multitude)”. 
81  “For were not tyranny in itself resistible, then a man might lawfully murder himself or give 
power to another to be his butcher” (Overton (1647). p. 330).
82  Worden (2001), p. 281.
83  Nedham (1650), chap. IV. N 377 1153_13. See also Nedham (1647). It would be a mistake, 
however, that Nedham opposed the Levellers thoroughly, as he is the probable author of Vox plebis, or 
the peoples out-cry against oppression, injustice and tyranny (1646). 
84  This is not to say that Harrington is a Hobbesian wolf under republican sheepskin, as Scott 
(1993) implies. For an assessment of Harrington’s critique of Hobbes’ absolute sovereignty, see 
Fukuda (1997), pp. 123-26.
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to be the author of whatever he that beareth their Person shall act” (XVII, p. 
120). If not represented by one person, the multitude is always incapable of 
action. Therefore, though consent is at the foundation of the artificial person, 
surely it is not enough to preserve it. 
Despite being on the other side of the political spectrum, the republican 
Harrington reaches the same conclusions as Hobbes with respect to the 
conditional exercise of power. In The Art of Lawgiving (1659),85 Harrington 
focuses on The Agreement of the Free People, to offer evidence that the 
Levellers proposals would inevitably lead to anarchy or at best to oligarchy. 
To that extent, the election of biennial parliaments consisting of 400 hundred 
representatives of the nation, and guarantees against the undue prolongation 
of mandates, were founded on two erroneous presuppositions. First, that 400 
hundred persons could represent five hundred thousand people; secondly, that 
there must exist constitutional reservations or a right of resistance against the 
supreme power. Harrington notes that if this assembly of 400 hundred persons 
is supreme, it is the sovereign de facto, not the people of England. To avoid 
that inconvenience, the Agreement states that the assembly must be dissolved 
after eight months, but this provision seems equally obnoxious, since it creates 
a vacuum of power. Once the assembly is dissolved, who would govern the 
nation? And if Parliament did not dissolve itself voluntarily, who would compel 
it to do it? In the end, government would be de facto exercised by an oligarchy 
endued with power to control the Parliament (p. 404). 
Hobbes and Harrington seem to coincide in condemning the Levellers’ 
proposals for being at once dangerous and fragile. This coincidence should not 
come as a surprise. As Harrington himself acknowledges in The Art of Lawgiving, 
“Where the sovereign power is not as entire and absolute as in monarchy itself, 
there can be no government at all” (p. 404). For both authors, a representative 
institution (whether the State, or two houses) occupies the space of sovereignty, 
and any form of political activity outside the institutions produces conflicts. In 
other words, every commonwealth must have a recognizable centre of decision, 
regulation and control to prevent civil war; to this purpose, this central power 
cannot be resisted.
However persuasive Hobbes’ and Harrington’s arguments could sound to 
their audience, it should be kept in mind that the Levellers rejected the premise 
that the existence of order – of the State and of the government – requires political 
institutions to embody and represent the people. While Hobbes and Harrington 
(and Rousseau later on) maintained that the “incorporated or constituted people 
displaces the several, constituting people”,86 the Levellers assumed instead that 
political power should not be circumscribed to institutionalized forms of action. 
85  Harrington (1711), p. 403. 
86  Pettit (2012), p. 289.
181The Levellers’ Conception of Legitimate Authority
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 20, nº 39. Primer semestre de 2018. 
Pp. 157-186.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i39.08
They contended that it would be a mark of tyranny if the representative replaced 
the disperse people (taken as an absent sovereign), or that, allegedly because 
of the size and complexities of the modern world, free men were restrained 
from participating in power. For them, the “people” may be both a multitude of 
individuals and a contingent collectivity.87 Considering the Levellers’ practices, 
representation was not treated as a filter that reduces the sphere of political 
activity to a level where it can be viable. The Levellers are the pioneers in 
adopting participative techniques by means of petitions, pamphlets, popular 
organizations and public demonstrations.88 These are extra-parliamentary 
practices of sovereignty that manifest active voices and deliver judgments on 
unfair laws.89 The Levellers envisaged the streets, the army, churches, taverns 
and even prisons as spaces of political action. No wonder that in December 
1647 the royalist newspaper Mercurius rusticus resented that England had 
converted “into another Athens”.
87  Loughlin (2007); Loughlin (2014).
88  Thomas (1974).
89  Urbinati, Nadia (2006). p. 25.
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